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Abstract 
Recent rapidly rising and volatile energy commodities prices and financial price manipulation 
scandals have brought the pricing mechanisms of crude oil derivatives to the fore of both popular 
press and policy initiatives.  Among the most important of such commodities is Brent Crude.  Brent 
Crude and its complex of derivative products make Brent Crude potentially more opaque and thus 
susceptible to price manipulation than other commodities.  In spite of the importance of Brent to the 
world economy and world energy prices, and its complex of derivative pricing, relatively little work 
has been done to explore the potential for, and evidence of, price manipulation in the Brent Crude 
complex.  This paper seeks to address this lack by proposing a method to test whether price 
squeezes have occurred in Brent Crude.  This paper builds on previous work which proposed an a 
priori test for evidence of manipulation and the theory of storage.  Previous work (Barrera-Rey and 
Seymour 1996) posited that the very close-to-delivery end of the forward curve for Brent should not 
be simultaneously in contango and backwardation, while other work (Geman and Smith 2012) 
proposed using an econometric prediction and a model based on the theory of storage to detect 
manipulation in commodity markets.  Our work builds on these approaches by developing a more 
detailed model of calendar spreads in the Brent Crude complex.  In Brent, a particular area of 
potential manipulation is from the relatively illiquid and more opaque physical OTC forward market 
(where prices are ‘assessed’ by Platts during a short ‘window’ of time) and the more liquid ICE 
futures market.   Our model relates prompt ICE futures calendar spreads to prompt-over-dated OTC 
forward spreads.  The model then tests whether the a priori indicators of manipulation as suggested 
by Barrera-Rey and Seymour are statistically consistent with the process which drives spreads 
historically.  We find that in most all cases, the indicated period of manipulation is statistically 
different.  We further investigate whether other factors, such as liquidity (volume and open interest) 
or world oil market conditions (using WTI spreads) or other forward market conditions could be 
driving our results.  The statistical difference is found to be invariant to the inclusion of these other 
explanatory variables.  We conclude that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of price 
manipulation and that the test provides a model and method for detecting such cases. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1 Introduction 
1.1 Rising oil prices and financial derivatives trading 
The importance of crude oil and petroleum products to the world economy and population is 
difficult to estimate, but would perhaps be difficult to underestimate.  Recent rapid rises in price 
levels, as well as apparently increased volatility in oil markets, therefore have been an important 
political and economic topic for major world oil consumer and producer economies.  The 
importance of oil to the world economy has been perhaps increasing commensurate with price rises. 
Commensurate with the trend of rising oil prices have been the general phenomenon of increased 
complexity in financial dealing and trading, and the rapid rise of trading in more complex financial 
derivative products across commodities, credit, and equity financial products.  A stream of scandals 
and financial crises, perhaps starting with Enron, the 2008 crash touched off by the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Bros, and subsequent financial meltdown led to increased financial regulation in the EU 
and USA, with legislation such as Dodd-Frank adopted in the USA.
1
  More recently, evidence has 
emerged in the case of the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) that bankers may have reported 
false rates to the LIBOR reporting agency (the British Bankers Association--BBA
2
) in efforts to 
influence the wholesale price of credit or derivative contracts tied to LIBOR.   
Energy markets have been at the fore of recent probes and investigations, with JP Morgan’s alleged 
manipulation of power markets hitting the public press in the same weeks as the LIBOR story was 
in the headlines (Bloomberg 2012).  In light of the scandals and also commensurate with an 
evolving understanding of the economics of trading, derivative contracts for commodities and 
financial instruments, and their pricing mechanisms also have been generating the interest of 
politicians, economists and regulatory agencies.   
1.2 Crude oil 
Refined product oil prices to the consumer ultimately follow from the prices in the complex of the 
underlying commodity, crude oil.  In spite of the obvious importance to consumers and economies, 
the mechanisms by which crude oil prices are set are complex and often little-understood by non-oil 
market specialists.  Oil prices are set via a world-wide informal system of spot prices, forward over-
the-counter, and futures exchange-based trading. Added on top of these so-called ‘vanilla’ 
commodities derivatives are options, swaps, contracts-for-differences (CfDs), all with various forms 
and specificities.   
The spot price for crude oil, the price of the underlying crude oil commodity for immediate 
delivery, can and does, vary by time-of-delivery (or cash settlement), location of delivery, grade, 
and other physical specifications (e.g., sulphur content).  The variations in the spot price are driven 
by fundamentals of supply and demand, but also by hedging, risk sharing, speculation and arbitrage 
trading activity. 
These fundamentals, along the with the primary function of hedging and traders’ need for liquidity, 
has led to a few underlying grades of crude to become benchmark crudes, with other grades of crude 
                                                          
1 The general legislation in the EU, the Market Abuse Directive, was adopted in 2003, DIRECTIVE 2003/6/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 28 January 2003, and was adopted in the UK in 2011.  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/what/international/pdf/mad%20(pl).pdf. 
2 Thompson-Reuters handles the reporting for the BBA.  http://www.bbalibor.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
or refined products often priced relative to the benchmark.  Of the benchmark crudes, Brent is the 
most widely traded and most liquid.  Other benchmark crudes include West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) and Dubai. 
1.3 Brent crude 
Brent is the light sweet grade of crude originally produced in the North Sea between the UK and 
Norway.  Brent crude remains the most important benchmark price in the world of oil commodity 
pricing, and has retained this position in spite of waning production.  The recent events of various 
market manipulations (e.g., LIBOR) and waning production have caused some concern and calls for 
an investigation into Brent pricing has been in the press (Kemp, 2012). 
Unlike some commodities, where the spot price is the price for immediate delivery, and where 
crude can be readily stored, the Brent crude commodity is produced at sea and delivered via 
pipeline to the Sullum Voe terminal, where it is loaded onto tankers.  Therefore, a spot price for 
Brent does not exist in the strictest sense; the spot price retains an element of ‘forwardness’ in that it 
merely indicates a date for delivery that is near (23 days).  The spot price, or so-called ‘dated Brent’ 
price, indicates that the crude is scheduled to be loaded within a three-day window, up to 23 days
3
 
in advance.   
1.4 Price manipulation 
The financial infrastructure built around crude grades such as Brent and WTI allow for complex 
trading and strategies in the commodities and their derivatives, in spite of waning physical 
production.  As financial trading has increased while production has declined, the implication is that 
a larger and larger amount of financial derivative contracts are being linked to an ever smaller 
underlying physical commodity.  This historical combination of events means that small movements 
in the price of liquid financial markets could be engineered with trade in the more illiquid 
underlying physical/cash/OTC markets.  The further development of the complex of derivative 
products based on the underlying commodity price has likely enhanced the incentives to engage in 
price manipulation schemes (Barrera-Rey and Seymour 1996), as potential losses from holding 
physical commodity contracts longer than would be economic (absent a price manipulation strategy) 
can be mitigated with complex derivatives trading strategies.   
Evidence of price manipulation in Brent and in energy derivatives has been in the press, with a 
number of cases to the fore recently.  In June, 2010, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
4
 fined 
an oil futures broker, Stephen Perkins, £72,000 for market abuse and prohibited him from the 
industry.  He traded an extremely high volume in the Brent crude futures market on a single 
morning in June 2009 and the FSA determined:  “As a direct result of Perkins' trading, the price of 
Brent increased significantly. Perkins' trading manipulated the market in Brent by giving a false and 
misleading impression as to the supply, demand and price of Brent and caused the price of Brent to 
increase to an abnormal and artificial level.”5  In another case, on April 19, 2012, the Commodities 
and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was granted a $14m settlement by the Federal Court in 
                                                          
3 The advance period has been changing over time, previously what was 15-day-ahead Brent became 21-day, then 23-day.  The exact 
specification of Brent has also been changing to allow for more grades and fields’ production, to account for the waning production 
from the original Brent fields. 
4 The FSA is the UK financial regulator. 
5 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2010/109.shtml 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
the Optiver case.  The case involved market manipulation in crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline 
futures markets.
6
 
In spite of these recent cases, and the importance of oil to the world economy, there in fact have 
been few cases of price manipulation proven involving the major benchmark crudes.  This may be 
due to the difficulty in detecting and proving market manipulations, along with the lack of a clear 
path to testing the ‘normalness’ of crude markets and their pricing complexes. 
Perhaps due to this difficulty, added powers and legislation have been given to the relevant 
authorities, and increased cooperation encouraged in the USA.  The FTC and CFTC in 2011 agreed 
to share information and cooperate on investigations of fraud-based manipulation cases in the 
energy sector.  On April 17, 2012, President Obama announced a new five-part plan to address oil 
market manipulation.  He has called on Congress to approve funding for these measures.  The main 
points of the plan are: 1) six-fold increase in surveillance and enforcement for oil futures market 
trading at the CFTC; 2) increased funding for the CFTC to update its IT resources for monitoring 
market activity; 3) ten-fold increase in civil and criminal penalties for market manipulation in the 
oil futures market; 4) give CFTC authority to raise margin requirements in the oil markets to help 
prevent manipulation and to help reduce market volatility; and 5) increase/expand access to CFTC 
data to examine patterns and trading activities in energy markets.
7
  Outside the USA, recently in 
July (2012), the EU was considering making new laws criminalising commodity price distorting 
market behaviour (Reuters 2012). 
The interest in commodities price manipulation and its difficulty in being detected thus remains an 
important policy context for major western policy makers.   
1.5 Rest of this paper 
This paper will focus on price manipulations that occur from trading in a single commodity, where 
there is direct trading activity among the products and players.  This paper will focus on identifying 
evidence of potential price manipulations in the Brent crude pricing complex. 
The work presented will not focus on the more general notion of speculation and financial trading 
causing some kind of general long-term rise in world oil prices. Pirrong (2012) likens allegations of 
more general price rises due to excessive speculation as “witch hunts”, but notes that they are 
“hardy perennials” and perhaps more enduring than witch hunts.8   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section reviews the literature on 
storable commodities pricing, Brent crude, and price manipulations.  Section 3 develops a model; 
Section 4 discusses the data and presents some preliminary data analysis.  Section 5 presents results; 
and Section 6 gives our conclusions. 
 
                                                          
6  http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6239-12 
7 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/17/fact-sheet-increasing-oversight-and-cracking-down-manipulation-oil-marke 
8 Interestingly, Pirrong (2012)8 notes that Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations considered that “forestalling” could distort prices, but 
likened fears of speculation to “terrors” and “fears of witchcraft.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
2 Review of Literature 
2.1 Commodities pricing 
In order to develop a model of price manipulation, it is necessary to first develop a model of what 
‘normal’ prices are.  This points towards the more general and large literature on commodities, 
forward, and derivatives pricing.  We focus on storable commodities in general, as well as crude oil 
to start. 
The foundations of pricing research for storable commodities is based on the “theory of storage” 
and the notion of intertemporal cash and carry arbitrage [Kaldor (1939), Working (1948, 1949), 
Telser (1958) and Williams and Wright (1991)].   
Geman and Smith (2012) consider the general theory of storage and propose a model for calendar 
spreads in precision metals futures prices.  The calendar spread is the difference between two prices 
for the same commodity but with different delivery dates.  They derive the spread and show its 
relationship to the convenience yield and interest rates.  They show that the interest and storage cost 
adjusted spread is equal to the convenience yield.  Their key insight, which originated with the work 
of Working (1927;1933;1934;1948;1949), Kaldor (1939), and Telser (1958), is that in normal 
contango
9
 situations, cost of carry relationships should govern the relationships between spot and 
forward prices, but in times of scarcity, when backwardation is likely, then convenience yield would 
dominate the cost of carry in the relationship.   
In their lucid summary of the literature and advancement of the theory, they propose two clear 
testable hypotheses about the relationships between spot and futures prices and inventory levels.   
Geman and Smith’s Proposition 1 considers when commodity markets are in backwardation, i.e., 
spot-price > near-dated futures price > longer-dated futures prices. In other words, the forward 
curve is downward-sloping.  However, they propose that the normal shape of the backwardated 
forward curve is convex, as the likelihood is that scarcity is a short-run phenomenon.  The 
likelihood is that the supply-demand imbalances in the current market will be resolved over time, 
and thus the near-term premium of the spot (or short dated futures) prices will tend to diminish with 
time to delivery.  When markets are in contango and inventory is not scarce, cash and carry 
arbitrage should dominate the forward pricing.  They posit that the limiting factors on a contango 
are cash and carry, but the limiting factors on backwardation are substitution in demand.  They 
reproduce Working’s original curve as an illustration of the relationship. 
                                                          
9 Contango is the state of the forward market where the price rises as the time-to-delivery increases.  Backwardation is the opposite. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
This leads them to their Proposition 2: In times of scarcity (low inventory) there should be higher 
volatility in spot prices, which should diminish with time to delivery.  In times of non-scarcity (high 
inventory), volatility of spot and futures prices should be reasonably similar. 
To test their theory, they reproduce Working curves for six metals categories and find reasonably 
good fits, which they illustrate graphically. 
They further test their more innovative hypothesis about the relationship between volatility of spot 
prices and inventory, and again find reasonable fits, which they illustrate graphically, although the 
relationship between volatility and inventory appears weaker than the spread versus inventory. 
They choose the following functional forms for their models.  For the spread, they use: 
      
 ( (       
Where, , is the spread, and A, C, and B are parameters to be estimated. 
      
 ( (       
Where sigma, , is the volatility, and , , and  are parameters to be estimated. 
Finally, they propose a method for detecting market abnormalities given their (tested) hypotheses.  
They propose that the predicted value for the spot-futures spread and volatility from a regression
10
 
with inventory levels can be used to determine if the market is functioning ‘normally’.  They use the 
ratio of the actual spot price to the predicted spot price, and the actual volatility to the predicted 
volatility.  They do not propose a formal statistical method for testing whether the two are different. 
They also use a graphical approach (which appears to point to some obvious spikes).   
                                                          
10 They do not use classical linear regression but use an exponential fitting approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
2.2 Crude price manipulation cases 
Besides the academic work of Geman and Smith (2012), the work of financial regulators in crude 
oil cases motivates our approach.  The details of the US Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission’s (CFTC) complaint in the Parnon/Arcadia (US CFTC v Parnon Energy, Arcadia, 
Wildgoose and Dyer) case are available from the CFTC.
11
  The CFTC complaint asserts that the 
calendar spread (the differential between front month West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude futures 
contract and the two-months-to-deliver contract) is the best market indicator of the relative 
conditions of WTI supply and demand.  There is also trade in the physical oil market for WTI at 
Cushing, and a three-day cash window between the expiry of the prompt month futures contract 
plus three days.  This enables market participants to further balance their needs for physical oil and 
delivery, but also influences the next prompt month futures contract prices and related derivatives 
prices.  The alleged scheme of the traders in the CFTC case was that the market was in 
backwardation (indicating a profit from a long calendar spread position – the prompt month price is 
higher than the next-later-month).  The traders allegedly bought up physical oil and then dumped 
this on the market/cash window (thus driving the spread down), while taking large short positions in 
the WTI calendar spreads.  Thus, the traders allegedly tried to use the illiquid cash/physical market 
in WTI to depress the price of prompt month futures contracts in WTI (and commensurately the 
calendar spread). 
2.3 Brent crude pricing and detecting manipulation 
Barrera-Rey and Seymour (1996) propose a priori tests of a squeeze in Brent crude; that is to say, 
they do not mean to test whether the squeeze has been successful, profitable, or otherwise—merely 
whether the balance of the evidence supports the idea that a squeeze was likely/could have been 
possible.  They do give detailed descriptions of how various squeezes, especially with contracts-for-
differences (CfD) positions, could be profitable.  Of particular note for our analysis is their 
description that, “Building large positions on the paper market may allow a participant to raise the 
value of first month relative to second month or dated Brent (or even another cargo priced off 
Brent),”—this sounds familiar to the CFTC Parnon/Arcadia case.  The importance of the spread for 
potential market manipulation is that it would be rare that market participants have sufficient 
leverage to reverse the overall trend in the market (Barrera-Rey and Seymour 1996).  Thus the 
spread enables participants to profit on smaller relative movements in the relative prices of adjacent 
month or similar contracts.   
Our focus in this paper will thus be on such cases, where the potential abuse runs from the relatively 
illiquid cash/physical over-the-counter market to the more liquid futures market. 
Barrera-Rey and Seymour propose the following as evidence of a squeeze (whether intentional or 
unintentional).  They take the price differential between dated Brent and first month Brent and 
compare this with the differential from first month Brent to second month Brent.  In other words, 
they compare the first adjacent calendar spread to the next adjacent calendar spread prices for Brent 
crude oil physical contracts.  They define a priori evidence of a squeeze as when the first month 
Brent contract price rises to a premium over both the dated-Brent and the second-month-to deliver 
Brent forward prices.  They add the condition that the premium of first month forward Brent over 
dated Brent should exceed 50cent/bbl, and also consider how the premium of first month Brent 
evolves over time.  On the second condition, that the premium of first month Brent over dated 
                                                          
11 http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfparnoncomplaint052411.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
should rise towards expiry, they note that this is not a necessary condition for a squeeze.  Finally, 
they also consider volatility of the alleged squeeze incidents.  They note that the first part of their 
measure was proposed by Horsnell and Mabro (1993).   
They test their data and find evidence of a squeeze in at least five months where their definition of 
the squeeze is satisfied. 
The precise hypothesis of why these conditions constitute a squeeze is not entirely described by 
Barrera-Rey and Seymour.  We propose that the correct interpretation is that it is highly unlikely 
that normal market conditions could cause a ‘lump’ in the term structure of the forward curve at 
such close dates to delivery.  We define ‘normal’ as meaning either consistent with cash and carry 
arbitrage or the theory of storage.  The windows of time in question were between 15 and 21 days to 
delivery, and then a month ahead of that.  ‘Dated’ Brent is merely front month OTC Brent that has 
been given a delivery date (within 21 days).  It is very unlikely that there could exist an expectation 
of tight inventories for Brent circa 21 days to delivery, and simultaneously relatively ample 
inventories expectations for Brent being delivered from 10-21 days to delivery, and further out than 
30 days to delivery.  In other words, in order for market fundamentals to be able to explain a ‘hump’ 
in the near-term forward curve for Brent, this would require market participants to believe there was 
some very short-term and transient shortage that was not around in the immediate term to delivery, 
would appear, and then disappear rapidly.  Such conditions are extremely unlikely. 
3 Model and data 
3.1 Commodities prices and calendar spreads 
Our model is based on the fundamental models of the theory of storage and cash and carry.  The 
cost of carry includes the opportunity cost of capital, which is the risk free rate, r, when cash and 
carry intertemporal arbitrage is possible.  This simplest model for the forward pricing of a 
commodity is: 
1)  F0,T = S0e
(r+c)T
 
Where, F0 is the forward price today, for delivery at time T, S0 is the spot price today, r is the risk 
free rate, c is the storage cost, and T is the time-to-delivery (and e is the exponential function 
operator).  Thus, the equation says that the forward price should equal the spot price, which 
increases over time-to-delivery at the risk-free cost of funds plus storage cost. 
In this simple case, the forward curve of prices for future delivery will rise with time at the rate r 
+c.  Thus, in the case of normal cash and carry arbitrage, the forward price should be greater than 
the spot price with time, and contracts for delivery further into the future should be priced above 
contracts for delivery closer to the present.  The state is called contango.  The alternative, where the 
forward curve slopes downward with time-to-maturity, is called backwardation.  
Empirically, we observe that markets can be in either contango or backwardation, so the basic cash 
and carry model must be extended.  The most common extension is to add “convenience yield”.  
Convenience yield is the extra value market players give to having the commodity on hand, to avoid 
stockouts, production process interruptions, etc. Convenience yield is an alternative factor that 
explains that having physical possession of the commodity might be more valuable than having a 
contractual right only to the commodity.  In our formula, convenience yield, cy, has the opposite 
effect of storage cost – it can be thought of as an inverse of storage costs. 
2)   F0,T = S0e
(r+c-cy)T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
When convenience yield is larger than the risk-free rate and storage costs, then the slope of the 
forward curve will be negative with time to delivery; in other words, the market will be in 
backwardation. 
In general, the above framework can be adopted for the relationships between different parts on the 
forward curve (introducing the price at time t>0 for delivery at time T), risk and the cost of carry.  
We can at t and w, the risk-adjusted interest rate to the model.
12
 
3)           
(       (     
It is useful to work in logs, and so taking the log of the above gives: 
4)                (       (     
The calendar spread is then the difference between (usually adjacent) points on the forward curve: 
5)                                = (        
This is similar to Geman and Smith (2012), who show the spread plus the cost of carry is equal the 
convenience yield. 
Where the above notation indicates the spread between products for delivery between T+1_T.  It is 
notable that the above model implies that the forward curve has a constant slope in its log-price 
form (prices grow/shrink at a constant rate in the levels).  This is at odds with empirical observation, 
which shows that the forward curve can switch from contango to backwardation, and can even 
display both at different maturities.  It is necessary then to allow for differences in the convenience 
yield and the risk adjusted rate.  Over short periods of time, i.e., months, and on the front end of the 
forward curve, we can assume that the cost of storage is constant. Let us therefore focus on 
convenience yield, and allow that to be time variant, and also allow for a terms structure of interest 
rates. 
6)                                (           (           
Essentially, convenience yield is assumed to be a function of exogenous factors, X, during the time 
between t and T+1.  Note that equation 5) rearranges to the formula derived by Geman and Smith 
(2012)
13
, i.e., that the spread, adjusted for interest and the cost of carry, is a measure of the 
convenience yield. 
7)                               (            (           
Essentially, convenience yield is assumed to be a function of exogenous factors, X, during the time 
between t and T+1.  Note that 5a) rearranges to the formula derived by Geman and Smith (2012) 
(5b)
14
, i.e., that the spread, adjusted for interest and the cost of carry, is a measure of the 
convenience yield. 
                                                          
12 The convenience yield can be negative or positive empirically; here we have put it in as a negative, because it is a negative “cost”, i.e., 
enters in the opposite way as the opportunity cost of capital. 
13 They define a slightly different measure of the spread as the percentage change in the futures price over the spot price; we use the 
log-differential, which is the continuous constant growth rate. 
14 They define a slightly different measure of the spread as the percentage change in the futures price over the spot price; we use the 
log-differential, which is the continuous constant growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
It is useful also to consider the difference between adjacent calendar log-spreads: 
8)                                (          (           
In other words, the difference between adjacent calendar spreads is equal to the difference between 
interest rates (risk adjusted) on the yield curve and the change in convenience yield over the time 
period.  Since for short time periods, interest rates and the cost of storage should be nearly identical, 
the differences in calendar spreads represent differences in convenience yield over time. 
Rearranging, gives and more formal model whose intuition is derived from the work of Barrera-Rey 
as previously discussed: 
9)                                (          (           
The model above says that the calendar spread of the second month over the first month 
futures/forward prices should equal the spread on the first month-to-deliver over the spot or 
immediate delivery price spread, plus an adjustment for the differential in the term structure of 
interest rates
15
 and the convenience yield (assuming that over the short time periods, physical 
storage costs are approximately constant). 
We wish to develop an empirical model for the above, and note that the convenience yield itself is 
not observable directly, whereas the spread can be calculated directly from market data on forward 
prices. 
A final development of our model is motivated by the work of Barrera-Rey and Seymour, and also 
by the case-details from the US CFTC and the Parnon/Arcadia case for WTI, where the alleged 
manipulation involved use of the physical market and ‘cash window’ to try and manipulate spreads 
in the futures markets.  The Brent crude complex includes a similar structure, with cash-physical 
crude OTC trading near to delivery, and linked to the ICE futures market.  We therefore want to 
pose the model in terms of the physical OTC forward and cash markets (forward dated and 21-day 
forward market spread in the case of Brent) and the impact of this market on the front month 
calendar spread in ICE Brent futures.  We further allow a constant elasticity parameter between the 
log-spread from the OTC-forward-physical market to the futures market.  The model becomes: 
10)                                     
Essentially, the spread is a measure of the convenience yield (adjusted for interest rates).  The 
spread one period ahead is the expected change in the convenience yield between the current 
delivery period and the next delivery period.  Current inventory levels should be fully reflected in 
the closest-to-delivery (prompt) spread.  Thus our measure of the spreads is in effect a measure of 
two convenience yields. 
11)                               
                                                          
15 Technically, the differential should be the difference between to implied forward rate from T to T+1, less the spot rate from today, t, 
to T (if t is in fact forward, such as the first month to delivery, then this should also be the forward rate from t to T, although the 
difference at such a short-dated portion of the yield curve is likely to be minimal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
3.2 A priori evidence of manipulation 
As discussed in the literature review section, there are relatively few papers proposing tests of 
market manipulation. Notable exceptions are Barrera-Rey and Seymour (1996) and Geman and 
Smith (2012). 
Barrera-Rey and Seymour (1996) propose the test of a priori price manipulation in the Brent 
complex as a test of whether the very short-dated forwards market appears to have an aberration in 
displaying both backwardation and contango.  In other words, if the front-month 21-day-BFOE 
price is greater than the price of dated BFOE and 2
nd
 month BFOE, then they propose this is 
evidence of potential price manipulation.  We use this same test to identify periods of potential 
manipulation; the test explicitly is: 
12)                            
And  
                        
In other words, if the price of forward Brent for prompt delivery is greater than the price of Brent 
dated for delivery (more immediate delivery than the 21-day Brent), and greater than the price of 
Brent for 2-month-forward delivery; the different between the short-dated prices should exceed 50 
cents per barrel, as an added filter on small aberrations due to illiquidity or other random factors. 
Barrera-Rey and Seymour do not explicitly articulate the mechanism as to why this is an indication 
of manipulation, but we hypothesize that the explanation is that the market cannot be consistent 
with the theory of storage.  In other words, the models of Geman and Smith (2012), following the 
work of others, suggests that calendar spreads, which measure convenience yield which dominates 
the cost of carry when the market is backwardated, should be explained by storage.  It is highly 
unlikely that the market for Brent crude could be in contango in the two closest to expiry forward 
contracts while in backwardation between the next two expiry dates. 
We propose to test the a priori evidence of manipulation, as identified using the Barrera-Rey and 
Seymour test, using a test of the convenience yields and the theory of storage.  The method 
proposed is to create time-specific dummy variables for alleged manipulations and then test whether 
the relationship between the convenience yields is statistically different for those identified periods. 
Because we do not have data on the storage and pipeline flows, loading programmes, etc, for all the 
market participants in the Brent Crude complex, we cannot test the theory of storage directly.  We, 
however, propose that the test of the two convenience yields as proposed in equations and can form 
an alternative test.  More specifically, we propose the test: 
13)                                                            , 
where the D  is a dummy variable identifying the period of the alleged manipulation (i.e., given 
equation 11 holds).  The test of manipulation is then the statistical test: =.   
3.3 Data 
The data used for the analysis are daily close futures prices and daily assessment prices for Brent 
crude.  The Futures prices are closing prices ICE prompt (first month), second month, and third 
month ICE Brent crude futures contracts.  The forwards prices are over-the-counter cash contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
for Brent, Forties blend, Oseberg and Ekofisk (BFOE) crudes, and are Platts Brent forward pricing 
data for the first three time-to-expiry contracts: dated Brent/BFOE, first month Brent/BFOE and 
second month Brent/BFOE.  Note that the first month Brent/BFOE simply becomes dated Brent at 
expiry.   
The period chosen includes all of the available time for which Brent futures prices have been 
available since October 2008 to the end of April 2012 (first and last trading days).  We chose the 
period beginning in October 2008 because this was the first period available after the financial 
crisis. 
For subsequent analysis, we also included data from ICE on Brent open interest and volume for the 
prompt (first month) contract.  We also used data for NYMEX West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
crude futures contract prices, for the prompt and next month-to-delivery. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      f1 1376 87.10 23.97 36.61 146.08 
f2 1376 87.41 23.48 39.17 146.60 
bfoe_dtd 650 79.74 21.12 39.67 126.64 
bfoe1 650 80.07 21.03 39.41 126.43 
bfoe2 650 80.55 20.58 40.01 126.22 
vol_f1 1331 126988.50 57047.04 8085.00 463810.00 
oi_f1 1299 129070.00 60888.25 8518.00 277256.00 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Periods of potential manipulation 
We first ran the test proposed by Barrera-Rey and Seymour on the data for all BFOE forward 
contract prices in the dated, 1
st
 month, and 2
nd
 month-to-delivery complex.  We chose the time-
period from October 2008 to the present (April 2012), as prior to the financial crisis, there was 
considerable volatility and other drivers prevailing in world commodity markets.  This analysis 
identified the following periods for the a priori evidence of potential manipulation: 
 
Period bfoe_dtd bfoe1 bfoe2 
12/07/09 - 15/07/09 59.44 60.45 60.27 
27/07/09 - 31/07/09 67.89 68.59 68.50 
09/09/10- 14/09/09 78.00 78.57 78.51 
15/12/10 - 25/12/10 92.46 93.06 92.97 
10/01/11 - 21/01/11 97.77 98.60 98.01 
28/02/11 - 05/03/11 114.90 115.58 115.42 
16/06/11 - 02/07/11 109.84 110.48 110.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
19/07/11 - 30/07/11 118.16 119.15 118.22 
 
The methodology was then to estimate Equation 13 econometrically and test the results of whether 
the coefficient on the alleged time period was different. 
4.2 Regression results 
We estimated a number of regression models with inclusion of various explanatory variables.  We 
first added a general time trend to Equation 13.  We estimated Equation 13 for each identified time 
periods separately (i.e., a separate dummy variable), and then overall for a model including all the 
time periods in the same model.  In other words, the slope coefficient estimates on the BFOE_1 to 
BFOE_dated calendar spread were restricted to just two parameters: one indicating a period of the 
alleged infraction; and one during a normal state for the near-to-delivery forward curve. 
The results of these regressions are found below in Table 1. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D_all 
          
lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd 0.216533*** 0.219551*** 0.215330*** 0.215349*** 0.220204*** 0.215285*** 0.214900*** 0.214434*** 0.232484*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
td -0.000031*** -0.000031*** -0.000031*** -0.000031*** -0.000030*** -0.000031*** -0.000031*** -0.000031*** -0.000030*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d0 0.218147         
 (0.542)         
d0_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd -0.540388         
 (1.288)         
d1  0.195150        
  (0.579)        
d1_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd  -0.477411        
  (1.391)        
d2   -3.296022       
   (7.646)       
d2_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd   7.983354       
   (18.527)       
d3    0.097088      
    (0.393)      
d3_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd    -0.240237      
    (0.954)      
d4     0.406854     
     (0.339)     
d4_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd     -0.991563     
     (0.821)     
d5      0.466335    
      (1.083)    
d5_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd      -1.135225    
      (2.630)    
d6       0.118667   
       (0.356)   
d6_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd       -0.287880   
       (0.865)   
d7        0.041272  
        (0.333)  
d7_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd        -0.098485  
        (0.809)  
d_all         0.267508** 
         (0.119) 
d_all_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd         -0.652445** 
         (0.287) 
Constant 0.483895*** 0.480950*** 0.483215*** 0.482919*** 0.479988*** 0.483278*** 0.483630*** 0.483949*** 0.472468*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
          
Observations 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 
R-squared 0.398443 0.400592 0.398535 0.399305 0.401014 0.398761 0.398811 0.398698 0.403156 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D_a_vol D_a_wti 
           
lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd 0.135702*** 0.131767*** 0.131680*** 0.137272*** 0.128496*** 0.125412*** 0.130413*** 0.130103*** 0.145660*** 0.155433*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) 
td -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000034*** -0.000018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d1 0.165689          
 (0.454)          
d1_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd -0.404459          
 (1.091)          
lnvol_f1 0.000636** 0.000631** 0.000616** 0.000660** 0.000632** 0.000635** 0.000635** 0.000640** 0.000614** 0.000685** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnoi_f1 -0.000155 -0.000141 -0.000136 -0.000190 -0.000154 -0.000153 -0.000154 -0.000159 -0.000117 -0.000083 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
winter 0.006021*** 0.006015*** 0.006059*** 0.006066*** 0.006540*** 0.006483*** 0.006061*** 0.006057*** 0.005925*** 0.003743*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
d2  -2.951843         
  (6.120)         
d2_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd  7.150828         
  (14.830)         
d3   0.060288        
   (0.310)        
d3_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd   -0.149719        
   (0.754)        
d4    0.401245       
    (0.267)       
d4_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd    -0.977254 -0.006632      
    (0.647) (0.006)      
d5     0.005645 0.384008     
     (0.003) (0.859)     
d5_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd      -0.919015     
      (2.085)     
d6       0.032194    
       (0.284)    
d6_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd       -0.074446    
       (0.691)    
d7        -0.034872   
        (0.272)   
d7_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd        0.089247   
        (0.662)   
d_all         0.254750*** 0.263956*** 
         (0.095) (0.093) 
d_all_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd         -0.618749*** -0.641424*** 
         (0.230) (0.225) 
lnsprd_wtif2_1          0.452066*** 
          (0.039) 
lnsprdf3bfoe2          0.040206*** 
          (0.008) 
Constant 0.576649*** 0.578848*** 0.578589*** 0.575197*** 0.581192*** 0.583650*** 0.580836*** 0.580911*** 0.570747*** 0.259272*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) 
           
Observations 844 844 844 844 844 844 844 844 844 821 
R-squared 0.468698 0.466530 0.467888 0.470570 0.469174 0.465966 0.468292 0.468123 0.467604 0.625657 
 
 
  
Table 1 shows the modelling results where only variables involving the spreads are included.  Table 
2 includes additional variables in the model which proxy and control for other factors, such as world 
oil market supply and demand conditions, as well as potential idiosyncrasies between the ICE Brent 
futures contract (and the on-exchange daily close prices) and the over-the-counter BFOE forward 
cash market (and the Platts assessment prices). 
The results in tables show a number of things.  First, in all the models, the coefficient on the log-
calendar spread of BFOE1-to-BFOE_dated is statistically significant in all the nine models 
estimated, in each of the two tables.  The magnitude of the coefficient estimate ranges from about 
0.21 to 0.23 in Table 1, and 0.136 to 0.16 in Table 2.  The sign of the coefficient on the log-calendar 
spread of BFOE1-to-BFOE_dated is positive as expected; a contango market in the short-dated cash 
OTC market (BFOE) indicates a contango market in the ICE Futures nearest-to-expiry markets.  
The spread coefficient is an estimate of the convenience yield, on average, over the period. 
The coefficient estimates on the slope-dummy variables for the BFOE1-to-BFOE_dated calendar 
spread (d0_lnBFOE1_dtd,….,d7_lnBFOE1_dtd, dall_lnBFOE1_dtd) are of particular interest, as 
they estimate the degree to which the periods identified by the Barrera-Rey Seymour test deviate 
from the theory of storage.  They are not statistically significant for any of the individual-period 
models, but for the model with all the eight identified periods grouped together 
(d_all_lnBFOE1_dtd) the variable is significant and of the expected sign (negative).  The indication 
is that the direction of the forward curve for the nearest-to-delivery OTC cash-physical market 
(BFOE), being either contango or backwardation, impacts the ICE Brent Crude front month spreads 
in the opposite direction to what would be expected given the theory of storage.  
In Table 2, the same set of regressions was run with added variables.  Regressions including volume 
and open interest as explanatory variables are included.  The volume variable has a positive as 
expected and significant coefficient in all the models, while open interest has an insignificant 
coefficient in all the models.  It is still important to include these variables as sensitivities in the 
models.  Volumes and open interest together are a good proxy of liquidity
16
 in the ICE Brent futures 
market.  It is conceivable a priori that the normal cycle of rolling over contracts at the end of the 
month and other liquidity factors could be driving our results, but the insensitivity of the 
coefficients and models to including volume and open interest point to the conclusion that liquidity 
and normal trading cycles are not likely explanations of our results on the calendar spread variables.  
We note that volume and open interest for BFOE contracts, an OTC market, are not generally 
available. 
In addition to including added variables on volume and open interest of prompt-month ICE Brent, 
we also added variables on the spread between 3
rd
 month-to-delivery ICE Brent over 2
nd
 month to 
delivery BFOE and the calendar spread for 2
nd
 month WTI over prompt WTI.  The first variable, 
lnsprd_f3_BFOE2, is included as a proxy for any market conditions in the forward curve that might 
be ‘normal’ between the ICE futures and BFOE OTC markets (and their price reporting 
methodologies—recall the ICE price data are daily close-mid prices, and the BFOE are Platts 
window assessment prices).  The second variable, the WTI prompt month calendar spread, controls 
for world crude oil market supply and demand conditions that are common to the two most widely 
used benchmark crude futures, namely, Brent and WTI.  In other words, to the extent that world 
crude and petroleum refining supply and demand conditions impact both of these spreads together, 
then these conditions are held constant when estimating the other coefficients in the model. 
Quite interestingly, inclusion of the two added variables has virtually no effect on the coefficient 
estimates of the main spread variable (lnBFOE1_dtd) and it remains significant and of the expected 
sign in all models. Likewise, the slope dummy on the front month BFOE to dated spread 
                                                          
16 We also tried a model of the ratio of volume to open interest, but the results were very similar and so we do not report these. 
  
(d_lnBFOE1_dtd) is not significantly impacted by inclusion of what might be expected to be a 
priori collinear variables.  The slope dummy variable is itself insignificant in all the sub-models, 
where the number of observations is limited, but is significant in the ‘all-in’ model where all periods 
are grouped in the one dummy.  
Finally, the table below shows the results of the statistical test of whether the two coefficients are 
equal on the spread for BFOE, where the period of question has been dummied.  The test is whether 
the slopes are equal for the general model versus the period in question.  For all but the first period, 
we find that the slopes are significantly different.  Thus the test of Berrara-Rey and Seymour is 
confirmed more rigorously using the theory of storage and appropriate time-series estimation 
techniques.  
Dummy 0 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d0_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =    0.48 
 Prob > F =    0.4893 
Dummy 1 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d1_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   12.03 
 Prob > F =    0.0006 
Dummy 2 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d2_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.75 
 Prob > F =    0.0006 
Dummy 3 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d3_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.75 
 Prob > F =    0.0006 
Dummy 4 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d4_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.89 
 Prob > F =    0.0006 
Dummy 5 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d5_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.73 
 Prob > F =    0.0007 
Dummy 6 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d6_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.70 
 Prob > F =    0.0007 
Dummy 7 lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd - d7_lnsprd_bfoe1_dtd = 0 F(  1,   645) =   11.70 
 Prob > F =    0.0007 
The conclusion is that the data and model suggest that world oil market conditions or idiosyncrasies 
that are generally in the ICE Brent futures to BFOE Platts forward curve do not account for: a) the  
relationship between ICE and BFOE spreads, and b) the different relationships in the periods of the 
alleged squeezes. 
  
5 Conclusions and future research 
This paper is a study of potential market abuse in the Brent crude oil derivatives complex.  Brent 
crude oil is one of the most important commodities in the world; the economies of the world depend 
on petroleum products and Brent is the most important benchmark price for crude oil.   
Brent crude oil prices are set by a range of different methods and markets, and the reporting of these 
prices is done either via exchanges or via assessments from market reporting agencies such as Platts 
and Argus.   
The physical production of Brent crude has been waning over time, and in spite of the addition of 
other grades and fields’ production to the contract, over-the-counter trades in physical-dated or 
‘wet’ Brent crude remain at least somewhat illiquid and therefore open to potential abuse. 
Recent legal action and cases, such as the CFTC case against Parnon/Arcadia/Wildgoose, involving 
WTI OTC physical trades and NYMEX futures, suggest that there is potential for abuse via using 
the more illiquid physical-dated markets to influence more liquid markets such as on-exchange 
futures. 
The case for proving market manipulations is difficult, however, and a lack of a clear path for 
testing such manipulations is no doubt part of the difficulty.  This paper seeks to address this lack. 
The literature on the theory of storage and cash and carry arbitrage in combination gives a fairly 
robust description of commodity prices, and crude oil prices in general.  When there is an absence 
of scarcity, then cash and carry arbitrage should drive the functional relationship between 
commodity price and time-to-delivery—a positive cost of carry indicates a contango, or prices 
increasing with time-to-delivery.  In the case of scarcity, or potential scarcity, convenience yield 
dominates the cost of carry, and backwardation, a downward-sloping forward curve, is observed. 
There has been little published on the subject of price squeezes in oil and crude oil markets, but one 
exception is the paper by Barrera-Rey and Seymour.  They propose a test for a priori evidence of a 
price squeeze in the Brent crude complex, as being when the dated Brent crude price (nearest to 
delivery) and the 2
nd
 month Brent crude price are both less than the 1
st
 month Brent price (all Platt’s 
BFOE OTC forward contract prices).  Thus the indication is that the front month contract has had its 
price driven up artificially.  We interpret this as being unlikely that such as pricing anomaly could 
be consistent with the theory of storage and/or cash and carry. 
Using the test and data from Bloomberg on ICE Brent futures and Platts Brent forwards, we 
identified the periods since October 2008 for which a squeeze might be indicated.  We then propose 
a test of whether the alleged squeezes are statistically significant.  The test involves a test of 
whether the historical relationship between adjacent products on the forward curve, calendar 
spreads, and holds.   
We therefore regressed ICE futures 2
nd
 month over 1
st
 month calendar spreads on the Platts BFOE 
1
st
 month-over-dated spread.  The method was then to allow the slope and intercept parameter 
estimates to vary for the period of the alleged manipulation, by using a slope and intercept dummy 
variable approach, and then testing whether the slope and intercept dummy parameter estimates 
were statistically different from the ‘normal’ period parameter estimates.   
The results showed a statistically significant relationship between the spread of front month BFOE 
spreads and its impact on the front month ICE Brent futures spread.  The individual periods 
identified, and their slope dummy coefficients, in all cases showed a coefficient that was statistically 
different from the ‘normal’ coefficient.  When including all the alleged periods in one regression 
  
with one slope dummy variable, the alleged price squeeze coefficient became statistically 
significant from zero, as well as being different from the ‘normal’ coefficient estimate. 
We then included other variables in the regression to account for potentially unmodelled effects that 
might be driving the result.  We included a winter dummy variable, plus variables on the volume 
and open interest on the ICE front month Brent contract.  We also included the front month calendar 
spread for NYMEX WTI futures and the spread between 3
rd
 month ICE Brent futures over 2
nd
 
month Platts BFOE forwards.  The volume and open interest variables proxy for the liquidity and 
market conditions in ICE Brent futures.  The WTI front month calendar spread’s inclusion controls 
for world oil market supply and demand conditions – to the extent that these are present in both 
NYMEX WTI and ICE Brent futures markets.  Finally, the spread of ICE 3
rd
 month futures over 
Platts BFOE 2
nd
 month controls for common forward curve conditions in Brent and any deviations 
between the ICE and Platts price data that would be non-transitory/anticipated by the market (at 
least from spot to the third month out).  The relationships estimated and the qualitative conclusions 
on the statistical significance and difference of the coefficients estimates were not sensitive to 
inclusion of any of the above additional variables. 
Thus our conclusion is that the identified periods are consistent with the notion of a price squeeze in 
Brent, and that the alleged squeeze potentially could impact from the OTC BFOE forwards market 
(which is relatively illiquid) onto the more liquid ICE futures market.  The alleged squeezes are 
unlikely to be explainable by the theory of storage or the theory of cash and carry, or some 
combination.  The standard conditions of the world oil market’s supply and demand and persistent 
and anticipated differences between the ICE and Platts pricing data are also not likely be driving the 
results.   
While we believe that the evidence supporting our conclusions is clear, we wish to urge caution in 
their interpretation, in that the evidence and conclusions are considerably limited.  The evidence 
merely has identified periods where the price complex is statistically different from the historical 
relationship, and argued that this is unlikely to be driven by storage, scarcity, world supply and 
demand, or persistent and anticipated differences between the futures and forwards pricing 
methodologies.  There is no evidence, and none should be inferred, as to intent or deliberateness of 
a squeeze, whether the alleged squeeze had material impacts on other prices in the complex, or other 
markets. 
Further research in the field is warranted before the generalness of the results can be confirmed.  For 
example, a similar approach could be used for other crude benchmarks such as WTI and/or Dubai-
Oman crudes.  It would be interesting as well to apply the model to other energy markets such as 
natural gas or refined petroleum products.  Still further, other authors such and Geman and Smith 
have suggested a similar regression approach, but that the predicted forward prices and predicted 
volatilities from a regression using supply and demand variables (e.g., stocks and usage), and that a 
comparison of the predicted prices would indicate market abnormalities.  Applying both approaches 
to a market such as WTI (where stocks and usage data can be obtained more readily), and 
comparing the results would also be of interest. 
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